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The aim of the present paper is to analyze the link between price
rigidity and indeterminacy. This is done within a cash-in-advance
economy from which we know that it exhibits indeterminacy at high
degrees of relative risk aversion. I ￿nd that price stickiness reduces the
scope of these sunspot equilibria: sluggish price adjustment requires
degrees of relative risk aversion compatible with indeterminacy that
prove too high to square with data.
∗I would like to thank Raul Barreto and Thomas Lubik for very useful comments. Key-
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E31, E32.1 Introduction
While often swept under the rug, a well-established fact in monetary theory
is that ￿exible price cash-in-advance models display sunspot equilibria for
weak degrees of intertemporal substitution (see for example Farmer, 1999).
This sort of real indeterminacy gives way for macroeconomic instability to be
generated by self-ful￿lling beliefs. The present paper extends this result to
monetary economies that are interspersed with price rigidity. In particular,
I show that if price stickiness is modelled as in Calvo (1983) then sunspot
equilibria in cash-in-advance economies become less likely, however, indeter-
minacy cannot be excluded unless prices are completely ￿xed.
2 The economy
The model constructed here is related in spirit to Farmer (1999). As well, it
features aspects of New Keynesian models as discussed by Goodfriend and
King (1997) for example. The arti￿cial economy is populated by immortal,
atomistic households of measure one who sell labor services and consume
the ￿nal good. Factor and ￿nancial markets as well as the market for ￿-
nal goods are perfectly competitive. Indetermediary goods are produced by
monopolistic competitors that set prices infrequently. Following Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2000) or Christiano and Eichenbaum￿s (1995) limited participa-
tion economy, I assume that ￿nancial intermediaries take cash deposits from
the households. They then loan these resources to intermediate ￿rms for
￿rms then being able to pay the workers in cash. As is typical in limited
participation models, money is held to satisfy a cash-in-advance constraint.










− ht β ∈ (0,1], σ ∈ (0,∞]
where β denotes the subjective discount factor, ct stands for the consumption
good and ht is hours worked. The coeﬃcient σ measures the relative risk-
aversion ￿ the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between consumption
2at diﬀerent dates. Hours worked enter linearly in the utility function. This
reduced-form function follows from assuming that labor is indivisible and
that a lottery for employment allocates labor as in Hansen (1985). In the
Appendix, I present a version of the model with a less than perfectly elastic
supply of labor. E0 is the expectations operator conditional on information
in period 0. People hold wealth in two forms. They can arrange cash-
holdings, mt+1, which they carry into period t +1. They can also loan cash,
nt,t o￿nancial intermediaries at the beginning of the period. These deposits
earn the nominal interest Rt.Id e n o t eb yΠt the pro￿t ￿ow from ￿rms and
intermediaries, hence, the household￿s budget constraint is given by
mt+1 = mt + Wtht − Ptct + nt(Rt − 1) + Πt
where Pt is the price level and Wt is the nominal wage. A positive value is
assigned to the inconvertible currency by assuming that during the shopping
session the household is subject to the cash-in-advance-restriction
mt + Wtht − nt ≥ Ptct.














Hence, πt+1 denotes the gross rate of in￿ation. The optimal choice of work







The ￿nal goods sector assembles the continuous range of distinct interme-








where υ ∈ (1,∞] denotes the elasticity of substitution between goods. Given
















Monopolistic competitors produce the intermediate products and have access
to the technology
yi,t = Ahi,t A>0.
Before hiring workers at the competitive wage Wt,t h e s e￿rms must borrow
cash at the short-term rate, Rt,f r o mt h e￿nancial intermediaries. Assuming
that each ￿rm i operates under perfectly competitive input markets, the ￿rm
determines its production plan by minimizing costs
RtWthi,t s.t. Ahi,t ≥ yi,t.





As in Calvo (1983), price adjustment opportunities are accorded to monopo-
listic ￿rms with probability 1−θ: θ → 0 corresponds to a world with perfectly
￿exible prices whereas at θ → 1 prices remain ￿xed forever. Each monopo-
list￿s intertemporal pro￿t maximization is to choose the optimal price p∗
t to
















where the household￿s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is the ap-
propriate discount factor for future pro￿ts and yi,t,t+τ is the ￿rm￿s period t+τ
output conditional on the optimal price. The dynamic ￿rst-order-condition




















Intermediaries accept cash from the households and receive injections
from the central bank. They use these resources to lend to intermediate
4￿rms for ￿rms being able to pay the wage bill. The loans must be repaid
at the end of the period. Consequently, the intermediary sector faces the
following constraint given the two sources of cash:






t stands for nominal money supply.
There is no government consumption. Nominal money supply grows at
the constant gross rate G =1 , hence, there is no in￿a t i o ni nt h es t e a d ys t a t e .
3 Sunspots
Having formulated the model, I will go about solving it by taking a ￿rst-
order approximation around the zero-in￿ation steady state. In doing so,
I denote percentage deviations of a variable￿s steady state by a hat, e.g.
b ct ≡ (ct − c)/c. In symmetric equilibrium, the monopolists￿ optimal pricing
equations transform into the New Keynesian Phillips curve
b πt = βEtb πt+1 +
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ
b Φt.
The household￿s ￿rst-order conditions reduce to
(1 − σ)Etb ct+1 = b ct − b Φt.
Noting that b yt = b ct,t h ea r t i ￿cial economy boils down to the second-order
functional diﬀerence equation






b yt = b yt−1. (6)
Since b yt+1 is a non-predetermined variable, unique dynamics require that
exactly one root of this equation is outside the unit circle. If both roots are
inside the unit circle, the economy is indeterminate. Equation (6) can be










5where M is a 2 ￿ 2 matrix whose elements all depend upon the parameters
that describe the economy￿s preferences and technologies. The determinant
of M is given by
DetM =
θ
1 − θ + βθ
2 − σ(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)




1 − θ + βθ
2 − σ(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
.
Indeterminacy will occur if and only if
−1 < DetM < 1 and − 1 − DetM < TrM < 1+DetM.




(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
, σ >
1 − 2θ + βθ
2




(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
and σ > 0. Within the admissible parameter space, the most binding con-
dition among the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for local indeterminacy






(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
> 0.
For values of σ above σ∗ both eigenvalues of M are smaller than one in
absolute value. Thus, ￿uctuations around the equilibria converge, that is the
adjustment dynamics to the steady state are indeterminate. It is for this
reason that one is able to construct sunspot equilibria.
How is the critical value of σ related to the other two deep parameters?












(1 − θ)2(1 − βθ)2 > 0.








Several conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, the minimum
value of σ that generates indeterminacy is increasing in the degree of price
stickiness. This reduces the previously known parametric space of indetermi-
nacy in cash-in-advance models. Second, if prices are perfectly ￿exible, the
parameter σ￿s lower bound for indeterminacy is reached. It equals two and
it is independent of β.T h e t w o r o o t s b e c o m e ￿1 =( 1− σ)−1 and ￿2 =0 .
This special case replicates the results in Farmer (1999) or Weder (2005a).
Third, with complete price stickiness, indeterminacy is no longer possible in
this class of cash-in-advance models since the critical value of σ rises to in￿-
nitely high degrees of relative aversion to risk. The equivalent insight can be








To gain further understanding of the impact of price stickiness on inde-
terminacy, I will calibrate the model. Let us assume that time evolves in
discrete units which are speci￿ed to be one quarter long. Accordingly, I set
β =0 .99.A t θ =0 .25, θ =0 .50 and θ =0 .75 the critical values become
σ∗ =3 .76, σ∗ =9 .89 and σ∗ =4 8 .37.
Now, what do the above numbers imply regarding the empirical plausi-
bility of sunspot equilibria in cash-in-advance economies with sticky prices?
Hansen and Singleton (1983) suggest that the coeﬃcient of relative risk is
between zero and two. Kocherlakota (1996, p. 52) states that values of the
coeﬃcient ￿above ten (or for that matter, above ￿ve) imply highly implau-
sible behavior on the part of individuals￿. Several recent empirical studies
have assessed the degree of price stickiness. Sbordone (2002) estimates the
average time between price changes and ￿nds it to fall in between 2.5 and
3.5 quarters. Bils and Klenow (2004) suggest more frequent adjustments of
prices than typical studies. They ￿nd that only half of goods prices do last
7￿ve month or more. Notice that in the model (1 − θ)
−1 is the average number
of periods for which a ￿rm￿s price remains ￿xed. Thus, Sbordone￿s numbers
correspond to model θ between 0.60 and 0.71.E v e n a t h e r l o w e r n u m b e r ,
I ￿nd a critical value σ∗ =1 6 .70 which is outside the empirically plausible
range. Phrased alternatively, Kocherlakota￿s empirical upper bound σ =5
requires modest degrees of price stickiness. Concretely θ must be smaller
than 0.34 (i.e. prices remain ￿xed for about 1.5 quarters), for sunspots to
matter. Although compatible with Bils and Klenow￿s ￿ndings which suggest
a value of θ at about 0.25, the potentiality of indeterminacy is weakened by
price rigidities.















Even an outlandish β =0 .10 together with θ =0 .60 implies σ∗ =8 .42 which
remains an unreasonably high number.
Overall, price stickiness appears to signi￿cantly reduce the possibility
of indeterminacy in cash-in-advance models. However, given the ongoing
empirical discussion on the degree of stickiness, the issue of the plausibility
of indeterminacy in cash-in-advance economies cannot be completely settled
here: the uncertainty about the empirical counterparts of θ and σ remains
simply too great.
Quite interestingly, it should be noted that stickiness increases the de-
terminacy region here whereas the opposite is generally found in the New
Keynesian indeterminacy literature with money-in-utility setups and inter-
est rate rules (e.g. Lubik and Marzo, 2005). It is my hunch that the opposite
results are the consequences of the very diﬀerent mechanisms from which
the indeterminacies arise i.e. how money demand is modelled and what the
central bank is doing in these models.1
1I would like to thank Thomas Lubik for pointing this out to me.
84D y n a m i c s
Lastly, let me comment on some basic business cycle properties of the cash-
in-advance economy. Empirically, impulse response dynamics show partiality
to a model of output that propagates shocks cyclically en route back to the
initial state (e.g. Farmer, 1999). This suggests that the roots of (6) should
be complex-conjugate. Can the model laid out here replicate this? Using the





> 1 and 0 <￿ 2 = θ < 1.
It is easy to show that output is described by the ￿rst-order equation
b yt = θb yt−1.
This means that the whole endogenous persistence arises from the degree of
price stickiness. However, this model is not able to generate cycles.
Under indeterminacy, cycles are driven by i.i.d. sunspot shocks ut+1 ≡








βθ +( 1− σ)(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
b yt−1 + ut+1.
In Farmer￿s (1999) ￿exible price version, the model predicts output dynamics




b yt + ut+1
which cannot mimic empirically observed impulse response dynamics and
cycles. A cyclical response to shocks requires that the associated roots are
imaginary. Does introducing price stickiness yield such a result? Mathemat-
ically, imaginary roots are equivalent to the condition (derived from matrix
M￿s eigenvalues)
∆ ≡ 4θ(θ − βθ
2 − 1) + (1 + βθ
2)
2 +4 σθ(1 − θ − βθ+ βθ
2) < 0.
9Given the parameter restrictions on β, σ and θ it is not possible to ￿nd such
a solution. In fact ∆ is never negative in the de￿ned parameter space. The
nonexistence can be seen as follows. Taking the limits, I ￿nd that
lim
σ→−∞∆ = −∞ and lim
σ→∞∆ = ∞.
The ￿xed point ∆ =0is compatible with the unique value of risk aversion
σ
∗∗ = −
(1 − 2θ + βθ
2)2
4θ(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
< 0.
Of course, σ∗∗ < σ∗. Hence, roots are always real in the indeterminacy
zone. Furthermore, numerical analysis reveals that the AR(1) root ￿ and it
turns out that it is also the larger root ￿ is always negative which means
that arti￿cial output is oscillating around the steady state every period. The
model can neither generate hump-shaped impulse response dynamics nor
cycles. To sum up, the model is able to bring about enormous persistence ￿
namely for σ slightly above σ∗ ￿b u tt h e s ec y c l e sd on o tr e s e m b l et h o s et h a t
we generally label as business cycles.
5 Concluding remarks
I have introduced Calvo-style price rigidity into a cash-in-advance model and
show that increasing price rigidity shrinks the parametric space of sunspot
equilibria. How does this result come about? Recall that the sunspot cycle in
the cash-in-advance model begins by people increasing today￿s consumption
in response to random sunspot signals. This rise in consumption pushes up
the in￿ation rate via the New Keynesian Phillips curve. As a consequence,
the nominal interest rate goes up and ￿ since the nominal interest rate op-
erates like an in￿ation tax on holding money given that people must satisfy
their cash-in-advance restriction ￿ this rise decreases tomorrow￿s consump-
tion. If the degree of relative risk aversion is suﬃciently high, the expec-
tations are self-ful￿lling, i.e. the beliefs are compatible with the pattern of
prices. On the other hand, if prices are sticky, the sunspot-related increase in
10in￿ation is smaller and the interest rate rises by less which curbs the drop in
future consumption. Sticky prices therefore counter the sunspot mechanism
in cash-in-advance economies.
Given the results here, I suspect that introducing money and sticky prices
into a real business cycle model with indeterminacy arising from increasing
returns to scale will lead to similar insights. Weder (2005b) is a ￿rst step
into this direction of research.
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136 Appendix
In the main text, I have assumed that utility is linear in labor. This was pri-
marily done to obtain results that are readily comparable to Farmer (1999).
This Appendix presents the local stability properties of the economy when
labor supply is less than perfectly elastic.











σ ∈ (0,∞], χ ∈ [0,∞]
which includes the main text￿s model for χ =0 .T h ep a r a m e t e rχ stands for
the inverse of the labor supply elasticity. This model transforms into




2 + χ(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
θ















2 + χ(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
1 − θ + βθ
2 − σ(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
.
Indeterminacy will occur if and only if
−1 < Detf M < 1 and − 1 − Detf M < Trf M < 1+Detf M.
The ￿rst two inequalities are the same as before, yet, the other two become
σ >
2(1 + βθ
2)+χ(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
and σ > −χ.




2)+χ(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
at which the two roots are
e ￿1 = −1 and 0 < e ￿2 =
θ
1+θ + βθ
2 + χ(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
< 1.
14Once labor supply is less than perfectly elastic, the indeterminacy zone
shrinks. This parallels the result in real business cycle models with indeter-
minacy arising from increasing returns to scale (see for example Wen, 1998).
In the ￿exible price version of this economy, the condition for indeterminacy
becomes
σ > 2+χ.
Survey data suggest fairly small labor supply elasticities usually around 0.25
which would put χ at 4.T h u s ,σ must exceed 6 in the ￿exible price economy
for sunspot equilibria to appear. Indeterminacy vanishes if labor supply is
perfectly inelastic.
15